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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN CONTRACT 
THOUGH CONTRARY TO STATE PoLICY-Plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, obtained 
from the defendant an insurance policy which was written and delivered in 
Texas. The defendant agreed to pay for any damages to plaintiff's truck 
caused by fire, but stipulated that any dispute over the amount of the loss 
should he determined by arbitration proceedings in accordance with the terms 
of the contract. The truck was damaged by fire in Arkansas and a dispute arose 
over the amount of the loss. Plaintiff refused to submit the question to 
arbitration and brought this suit in the Federal District Court for Arkansas. 
Defendant argued that the action was premature since compliance with the 
arbitration provision was a condition precedent to court action. Plaintiff did 
not deny that the law of the place of making generally determines the validity 
of contract provisions, or that the arbitration provision would have been valid 
in Texas, but contended that since the public policy of Arkansas, as declared 
by statute,1 opposed arbitration in insurance actions, the clause was unenforce-
able. Held, action dismissed. Since it did not appear that the Arkansas court 
would have denied effect to an arbitration provision which is valid in the state 
where the contract was made and delivered, the federal court sitting in that state 
must enforce the provision. This rendered the action premature. Miller v. Amer-
ican Ins. Co. of Newarh, (D. C. Ark. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 160. 
The general rule of conflict of laws is that a contract valid at the place of mak-
ing or the place of performance will be enforceable in the state of the forum even 
though such a contract would not be enforced by the courts of the forum had it 
been made, or was performable, within the state. 2 In insurance cases, the sub-
stantive law of the state where the policy was made and delivered will prevail over 
the law of the forum.3 The fact that the action is brought in federal court rather 
than the court of the state should not change the end result. In diversity of citi-
zenship cases, the federal court must apply the conflict of laws rules prevailing 
in the state in which it sits.4 Thus in the principal case the court properly 
examined "the decisions of the Arkansas court to decide what rule would have 
been appli~d had the case first arisen in that jurisdiction. 5 The general rule 
1 The statute declares void those provisions which deprive the insured or beneficiary 
of jury trial on questions of fact. Ark. Stat. (1947) §66-509. 
2 GoonrucH, CoNFLICT oI' LAws, 3d ed., §§106, 107, 109, 110 (1949); STUMBBRG, 
CoNFLICT OI' LAws, 2d ed., 226-241 (1951). 
3 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ruby, 219 Ark. 729, 244 S.W. (2d) 491 (1951). See 
Faude, "Conllict of Laws Applied to Automobile Insurance,'' 1950 INs. L.J. 818. 
4 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941); 
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023 (1941). See Clark, "State Law in the 
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,'' 55 YALE L.J. 267 
(1946); Wolkin, "ConHict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era," 94 UNIV. Pa. 
L. RBv. 293 (1946). 
5 The court first recognized that the provisions would have been void had the contract 
been made in Arkansas, citing decisions of that state. But the court then looked to Ar-
1955] RECENT DECISIONS ll79 
that the law of the situs of the transaction will be applied to the substantive 
legal issues is subject to the exception that no right will be enforced which 
would contravene the public policy of the state of the forum. 6 This exception it-
self is subject to qualification since constitutional objections may arise should the 
forum capriciously apply its·own substantive law rather than the law of the situs 
of the transaction.7 Apart from the constitutional issues, the vagueness of the 
term "public policy'-' presents a serious problem of definition.8 In every action 
in which the law of the forum differs from the law of the situs, the path is 
open for the argument that the public policy of the forum opposes and prevents 
the application of the foreign law.9 The courts agree that a mere variance 
between the laws of the two states should not prevent the enforcement of a 
foreign law.10 It has also been said that the courts should not refuse relief 
unless the application of the law of the other state would "violate some funda-
mental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some 
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."11 Yet no rule of law has been 
formulated by which the outcome of the public policy argument may be pre-
dicted.12 The more recent cases shed no further light on the uncertainty that 
now exists.13 In deciding whether to refuse to apply the law of the situs for 
kansas decisions on other foreign contracts held valid by the law of the place of making 
though they would be void if made in Arkansas, and concluded by analogy that Arkansas 
would have enforced the arbitration provision if faced with the problem of the principal 
case. 
6 See GoonroCII, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., §§11, 106 (1949); STOMBERG, CoN-
FLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 168-171, 278-279 (1951). 
7 Denial of due process and full faith and credit have been argued in conflict of laws 
cases. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S.Ct. 338 (1930); Bradford Electric 
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 S.Ct. 634 (1934); John Hancock Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129 (1936); Order of United Commercial 
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S.Ct. 1355 (1947). 
s See Nutting, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 MINN. L. 
REv. 196 (1935). In 33 CoL. L. Rllv. 508 at 514 (1933), public policy is referred to as 
an "amazingly shifty phenomenon." 
o The situations in which the public policy argument can be made are uulimited. 
For an excellent collection of the many types of cases in which it has been made, see 33 
CoL. L. Rllv. 508 (1933). 
10 First Nat. Bank v. Chuck Lowen, Inc., 128 Colo. 104, 261 P. (2d) 158 (1953); 
Whitney v. Pemod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N.W. (2d) 131 (1948); Warner v. Florida Bank 
& Trust Co., (5th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 766; Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. (2d) 108, 
109 P. (2d) 701 (1941). 
11 Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99 at 111, 120 
N.E. 198 (1918). The Restatement requires the contravention of a "strong" public 
policy. CONFLICT OF LAws RllsTATllMENT §612 (1934). Some writers feel that local 
public policy should be applied sparingly. See Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement 
of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918); Goodrich, "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 
25 VA. L. Rllv. 26 (1938). 
12 See note 8 supra. 
13 Generally the courts pay lip service to the public policy limitations but give no 
exacting explanation of why the foreign law may or may not be enforced because of local 
policy. Among the cases finding local public policy supreme are Ciampittiello v. Campi-
tello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A. (2d) 669 (1947); Fahy v. Lloyd, (D.C. Mass. 1944) 57 F. 
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policy reasons, the effect of the decision on the substantive rights of the parties 
should receive consideration. If the refusal of the court to hear the case only 
denies the plaintiff the use of the courts of the forum but does not deprive 
him of the right to bring the action elsewhere, the use of the public policy 
exception is more easily justified than if serious prejudice would result. Thus, 
when the effect of the exception is to deprive the defendant of a substantive 
<lefense so that affirmative enforcement is possible in the forum, the court 
should not apply the public policy of the forum to the detriment of the party 
who relies on the law of the situs of the transaction.14 In the principal case, 
the court properly followed the Arkansas conflict of laws rules and applied 
the law of Texas to the contract. The application of the Arkansas statute to 
the insurance policy would allow the plaintiff to capitalize solely on his ability 
to serve the defendant in Arkansas. It would be an unusual public policy 
which would reward the plaintiff for the discovery of a jurisdiction in which 
the defense of the insurance company is not recognized. 
William G. Gloon, Jr., S.Ed. 
Supp. 156; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 15 N.W. (2d) 8 (1944);,,, -
Liberthal v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W. (2d) 547 (1946); Reed 
v. Kelly, (7th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 473; Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, (D.C. N.Y. 1940) 
36 F. Supp. 396. illustrative of the cases applying the law of the situs despite local public 
policy are American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon, Sons & Co., 210 Ind. 
112, 1 N.E. (2d) 606 (1936); Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883 (1936); 
Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); Rubin v. Schupp, (9th Cir. 
1942) 127 F. (2d) 625; Tate v. Hain, 181 Va. 402, 25 S.E. (2d) 321 (1943). 
14 The distinction between refusal to hear the case and affirmative enforcement of the 
foreign action by application of local public policy is emphasized in Holderness v. Ham-
ilton Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Fla. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 145. 
